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Articles 
THEDA Y AFTER: DO WE NEED A 
"TWENTY -EIGHTH AMENDMENT?" 
Joel B. Grossman* and David A. Yalof** 
Having decided on a fixed term presidency and quadrennial 
electoral assessment of a president's performance, and having all 
but abandoned the parliamentary model of a "president" be-
holden to Congress for his power, the framers of our Constitu-
tion decided to hedge their bets. They provided that the presi-
dent (as well as other officers) could be removed by the 
Congress, but only through the extreme measure of impeach-
ment. Only two presidents have ever been impeached, and none 
has been convicted and removed from office. In fact, only sev-
enteen persons have been impeached in the 210 years of gov-
ernment under the Constitution: two presidents, one Supreme 
Court justice, one cabinet member, one senator (whom the Sen-
ate refused to try), and twelve lower federal court judges. In the 
twentieth century, prior to the impeachment of President 
Clinton, only judges have been impeached (although President 
Nixon would almost certainly have been impeached had he not 
resigned). 1 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the constitutional im-
peachment standard of "treason, bribery, or other high crimes 
and misdemeanors,"2 it is now generally accepted that a presi-
dent should be impeached only if he or she has engaged in con-
duct that constitutes substantial misconduct in office, akin to 
what the 1974 House Judiciary Committee Task Force later 
• Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University. 
•• Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut. 
I. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A Con-
stitutional and Historical Analysis (Princeton U. Press, 1996). 
2. ld. at 1·21. 
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termed a serious "constitutional wrong."3 Andrew Johnson 
clearly and knowingly refused to comply with an act of Congress 
(albeit a politically inspired one later held to be unconstitu-
tional4), Richard Nixon was accused of obstructing justice, and 
Bill Clinton was accused of both that offense and of committing 
perjury before a grand jury. Other presidents have engaged in 
activities of dubious legal or constitutional validity (e.g., FDR's 
Lend Lease policies to aid Britain, JFK's Bay of Pigs invasion, 
and the Reagan-Bush Iran-Contra affair), but were never seri-
ously threatened with impeachment. Thus it may be said that 
impeachment of a president is the unpredictable product of per-
ceived misconduct and political opportunity. 
When the Supreme Court ordered the release of the Water-
gate tapes in 1974, there was widespread and ultimately biparti-
san agreement that Nixon's behavior constituted an impeachable 
offense. Debate about President Clinton's behavior, however, 
revealed no similar consensus. Indeed, Clinton was impeached 
by a slim, partisan majority contrary to the overwhelming judg-
ment of the American people who, while condemning his inap-
propriate behavior, wanted him to remain in office for the dura-
tion of his term. Despite these differences, however, the 
proximity of the Nixon and Clinton cases suggest that we are en-
tering a new era in which impeachment may not be limited to ex-
traordinary abuses of presidential power or serious threats to 
governmental legitimacy, but may extend to executive actions 
that are merely offensive or improper. 
President Clinton's impeachment and subsequent trial be-
fore the Senate have revealed worrisome ambiguities in the 
Constitution's impeachment provisions, and have created under-
standable concerns about the absence of any formal check on 
potential congressional abuse of the impeachment process. 
These concerns may have been alleviated somewhat by Clinton's 
acquittal in the Senate, but they have certainly not been put to 
rest. This is particularly true since the Supreme Court has all but 
decided that it will not resolve such ambiguities or provide such 
a check. In the Court's view, impeachment is a nonjusticiable 
"political question" that is not reviewable because it is commit-
3. See The Impeachment Repon: A Guide to Congressional Proceedings in the 
Case of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States (New American Library, 1974). 
4. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
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ted by the Constitution to the sole discretion of a coordinate 
branch.5 
It is thus likely that every time a president is subjected to 
impeachment these same constitutional issues will be debated 
again and again, without much hope of increasing coherence or 
resolution. Self-imposed congressional restraints may regress 
into license, the concept of the fixed-term presidency will be fur-
ther eroded, and governmental stability fostered by the separa-
tion of powers principle will be endangered. How long will it be 
before the next Republican presidential foible ignites an im-
peachment inquiry by spiteful Democrats seeking revenge? Im-
peachment of the president, an extraordinary remedy designed 
to condemn offenses that truly threaten the fabric of our gov-
ernmental system, will continue to lose integrity and moral force 
as it becomes merely a mainstream strategy for partisan attack-
a forum for the "legalization of political disputes" rather than an 
ultimate sanction reserved for misconduct that cannot be re-
solved by the political and/or electoral process. 
The day after he took office on August 9, 1974, President 
Gerald Ford sought to reassure the nation by declaring that "the 
Constitution works." In light of the Clinton impeachment crisis, 
no such assurance is possible today. Even though the president 
was acquitted and the nation may have been spared the most 
drastic consequences of impeachment confusion, we are con-
vinced that the impeachment process no longer "works." 
It is thus appropriate and important, now that the Clinton 
matter has been concluded-but before a similar crisis occurs 
again-for the nation and the Congress to consider the implica-
tions of, and attempt to reverse, impeachment's downward 
course. The nation must contemplate seriously what impeach-
ment should be: who can and should be impeached? for what 
reasons? and by what processes? Whether or not there should 
be an ultimate judicial check is also a question that merits fur-
ther thought. We seek to encourage this debate by formulating 
for discussion a draft constitutional amendment that articulates 
our thoughts on how impeachment should work in the twenty-
first century. 
We recognize, of course, that a constitutional amendment 
cannot by itself correct all the problems of the political system, 
whose roots lie deep in our evolving and increasingly diverse, 
5. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,228 (1993). 
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fractious, and partisan political culture. No artificial separation 
between the Constitution and politics is possible-or desirable. 
But clear constitutional language helps to structure political ac-
tion, while at the same time contributing to its legitimacy. Thus 
debate over this proposed amendment is an appropriate way to 
stimulate a thoughtful and objective reconsideration of the im-
peachment process. 
Existing provisions for impeachment are spread throughout 
Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution. To enhance coherence 
we believe that all impeachment provisions should be combined 
in a single location. Thus, our proposed amendment includes 
some existing constitutional provisions and language that we 
would retain, as well as suggested clarifications, new language, 
and substantive changes. 
The major goal of the "28th Amendment" would be to en-
sure that impeachment of a president remains a rare occurrence, 
limited to those occasions when he or she has significantly 
abused the powers or threatened the integrity of the office. Im-
peachment should not be utilized merely to rebuke a president 
for inappropriate behavior or, even worse, to settle partisan ac-
counts. It should reflect a widespread and bipartisan consensus 
that removal is absolutely necessary for the good of the nation. 
Section 1 thus replaces the constitutional words "high crimes and 
misdemeanors," which are ambiguous, confusing, and the subject 
of much controversy, with a more detailed specification of of-
fenses. It makes clear that a criminal offense, depending on its 
character and severity, may warrant impeachment and removal, 
but that an impeachable offense need not be criminal in nature. 
For example, if the president were to move to Paris and attempt 
to conduct the business of government by email and fax, that 
would surely be grounds for impeachment. A president's refusal 
to conduct a war declared by Congress, or to fulfill some other 
significant constitutional duty such as refusing to make any ex-
ecutive or judicial appointments, or refusing to inform Congress 
of the "state of the union," would also be impeachable (particu-
larly if attempts at political and/or judicial resolution were un-
availing). This is not to say, of course, that such alleged actions 
would or should actually result in impeachment and conviction 
in a particular case, only that they are examples of a constitu-
tionally appropriate basis for congressional action. 
Section 2 repeats the constitutional language assigning sole 
responsibility for impeachment to the House of Representatives. 
However we have converted the Senate's "sole power to try im-
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peachments" to an "exclusive right to try impeachments" in or-
der to emphasize that while only the Senate can try articles of 
impeachment voted by the House, it is (or should be) under no 
constitutional obligation to do so. Section 2 also raises the bar-
rier for conviction slightly by requiring a two-thirds vote of the 
entire Senate for conviction, rather than merely two-thirds of the 
senators present. Although in practice there may not be much 
difference between the two standards, requiring an absolute two-
thirds majority may help to ensure greater bipartisanship and le-
gitimacy, and also to further strengthen the recognition that im-
peachment and trial of a president is a matter of the utmost 
gravity. 
In the spirit of open discussion to which our proposal is di-
rected we identify an additional change that we considered but 
did not include in our proposed amendment: requiring that a 
House vote to impeach a president receive the approval of a 
majority of the members of each political party, and similarly, 
that a Senate vote to convict and remove a president receive the 
approval of two-thirds of the members of each party. Such a 
rule would insure a bipartisan basis for impeachments and re-
movals-a threshold that seems desirable. We did not include it 
because parties, to say nothing of the two party system, are not 
otherwise mentioned in the Constitution. To constitutionalize 
them in this way might have ramifications not otherwise desir-
able. 
Section 2 also partially endorses the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Nixon v. United Statei which upheld the right of 
the Senate to use a summary committee procedure in trying im-
peachment charges against a federal judge (or, arguably, other 
constitutional officers). We believe, however, that such expedi-
ents, although cost-effective and efficient, are inappropriate 
when a president is tried, and they would be prohibited. Finally, 
we include in Section 2 the requirement that articles of im-
peachment passed by the House be tried by the Senate during 
the same session of Congress, and that the impeachment process 
be disabled after a general election until a new Congress is con-
vened, thus eliminating the possibility that lame-duck represen-
tatives or senators could vote on impeachment matters.7 
6. Id. 
7. We thus eliminate the problem described in Bruce Ackerman, The Case Against 
Lame Duck Impeachment (Seven Stories Press, 1999). 
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Section 3 confirms what already exists in tradition if not in 
constitutional language: that removal from office (of any im-
peached officer) is automatic upon conviction by the Senate, but 
that disqualification from holdinr future federal office requires 
an additional vote by the Senate. This is now routinely done by 
majority vote; we would require a two-thirds vote. Section 3 also 
constitutionalizes the majority (but by no means universal) con-
sensus that the president is not subject to criminal charges while 
in office. This common sense view is based both on clear consti-
tutional inferences and on the self-evident proposition that there 
is only one president, whose presence and undivided attention 
are needed to run the government properly.9 For obvious rea-
sons we would not extend this immunity to the vice-president, 
cabinet members, or federal judges. Indeed, such a distinction 
already exists in practice. Judges impeached and removed in the 
twentieth century have been routinely convicted (although in 
one case, acquitted) of criminal acts prior to impeachment pro-
ceedings. 
Our proposed ban on civil actions against a president (for 
essentially the same reasons as barring criminal actions against 
him) would reverse the Supreme Court's myopic decision in 
Clinton v. Jones 10 by extending to him or her, while in office, 
temporary immunity from such litigation. At the same time we 
would give Congress the power formally (which some believe it 
has anyway) to extend the statutes of limitations in both state 
and federal courts to ensure that a wrongdoing president cannot 
escape ultimate personal responsibility for his actions. Section 3 
also confers on Congress the power (which it almost certainly 
has now, at least with respect to federal prosecutions and suits in 
the federal courts) to completely and permanently immunize the 
president from civil suits and/or criminal charges in both state 
and federal courts if such action appears to be necessary to facili-
tate a face-saving resignation or a resolution of charges short of 
actual impeachment and conviction. 
8. Indeed, after being acquitted in a federal trial, then impeached and convicted 
and removed from office for engaging in a conspiracy to commit a bribe, Judge Alcee L. 
Hastings was eventually elected to the House of Representatives by his Florida constitu-
ents. 
9. As Justice Jackson clearly recognized in the Steel Seizure case, "(i]n drama, 
magnitude, and finality (the president's] decisions so far overshadow any others that al-
most alone he fills the public eye and ear." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579,653 (1952), (Jackson, J., concurring). 
10. Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997). 
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Section 4 confers on Congress the explicit power to censure 
presidential actions by means other than impeachment when 
that seems warranted. Acknowledging that Congress has a 
range of options below the level of impeachment in dealing with 
alleged presidential misconduct would help to ensure that im-
peachment is reserved for only the most serious abuses of presi-
dential power. Section 4 also specifically gives Congress the 
power to deal with judicial disability or misconduct below the 
Supreme Court level by separating the "good behaviour" clause 
of Article III, Section 1 from impeachment proceedings. (Presi-
dential disability is, of course, addressed by the 25th Amend-
ment.) Congress could then provide, for example, for the re-
moval of disabled or "non-performing judges," or for the 
immediate suspension of any federal judge convicted of a felony 
in a federal court, and automatic removal from office when all 
appeals of that conviction have been exhausted. This would un-
burden the impeachment process considerably. Maintaining the 
integrity of the federal bench ought not to depend on the vicissi-
tudes of impeachment. Virtually all states have similar provi-
sions in the their laws and constitutions. This would not threaten 
judicial independence, properly understood; and it would further 
emphasize that the impeachment remedy must be tailored to the 
role and function of the officials to whom it applies. 
Section 5 closes a constitutional loophole by making clear 
that a president may not pardon himself from federal criminal 
liability. The pardon power already excludes impeachments, but 
the Constitution does not specifically prohibit self-pardons for 
criminal actions, although none has ever been issued. President 
Clinton announced during the impeachment proceedings that he 
would not, in any case, take such action.u And President Nixon 
never acted on the advice of his lawyers that he could do so.12 
Nevertheless it seems prudential to specifically prohibit self-
pardons which, if they were ever issued, might cause a serious 
crisis of political legitimacy. A presidential self-pardon would 
simply add fuel to a fire that never should have been ignited in 
the first place. 
II. White House lawyer Charles Ruff assured the House Judiciary Committee on 
December 10, 1998, that President Clinton would neither pardon himself nor accept a 
pardon from his successor. Sec also Brian Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional 
Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 Yale L.J. 779 (1996). 
12. Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, The Final Days 357 (Simon and Schuster, 
1976). 
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Section 6 addresses a particularly difficult and vexing is-
sue-whether impeachment by the House of Representatives 
and/or conviction by the Senate may be reviewed by the Su-
preme Court. In the case involving federal judge Walter Nixon, 
the Court appeared to hold that the Constitution did not permit 
such judicial intervention.13 Although the majority opinion's lan-
guage was broad enough to cover all impeachments, and not just 
those of federal judges, we believe that impeachment of a presi-
dent, which involves much higher stakes, warrants some poten-
tial (but not required) judicial scrutiny to assure its legitimacy. 
Several justices in the Nixon case addressed this problem in their 
opinions and concluded that there might be occasions where a 
presidential impeachment is so illegitimate that it could not be 
condoned or judicially ignored.14 
Impeachment is a political process that should not be con-
verted to a judicial one, but in our judgment all avenues of judi-
cial review should not be foreclosed. For example, should the 
Court sit by idly if the president is impeached for no reasons at 
all, or denied all semblance of due process? To resolve the am-
biguity of the Nixon decision, to ensure that impeachment of the 
president conforms to understandable constitutional require-
ments, and to avoid the consequences of an impeached and con-
victed president unwilling to accept the legitimacy of that ver-
dict, we have proposed that an impeached president (but only 
the president) be permitted to seek judicial review of both the 
procedures and the constitutional basis for such an impeach-
ment. The Supreme Court would not have to decide such a case, 
but it would have an opportunity to prevent a clear procedural 
or interpretive abuse of the impeachment power. 
We would not extend this right of the president to seek ju-
dicial review of impeachment to trial, conviction, and removal 
from office by the Senate, for two reasons. First, the basic issue 
of whether an impeachable offense had been properly alleged 
(and found} would already have been litigated; if the Court ap-
proved the constitutional basis of articles of impeachment, the 
Senate could proceed to try the president unburdened by any 
13. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993). As Chief Justice Rehnquist as-
serted in his majority opinion, "We agree ... that opening the door of judicial review 
would 'expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos."' I d. 
14. In Nixon, Justices White and Blackmun expressed the view that the Constitu-
tion did not forbid consideration of the contention that the method of impeachment had 
violated the Constitution. Justice Souter also believed judicial review of impeachment 
might be justified under "different and unusual circumstances." 
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doubts about the constitutionality of the impeachment; and a 
convicted president would have a less credible basis for contest-
ing that conviction. Second, to permit review of an impeach-
ment conviction by the Senate might delay an orderly transition 
of power and leave open the question, perhaps for a painfully 
long time, of who actually was president. A presidential succes-
sion hiatus is a risk that our system should not invite. 
Empowering the Supreme Court to review the impeach-
ment of a president does, however, present at least one signifi-
cant problem. Would it create a conflict of interest, or at least 
the appearance of a lack of impartiality, if the chief justice both 
participates in a constitutional review of articles of impeach-
ment and then presides over a Senate trial based on those same 
articles? We believe that establishing an opportunity for judicial 
review of the impeachment of a president is too important to be 
rejected for this reason alone. Moreover, upon closer examina-
tion, such a "conflict of interest" problem may be no problem at 
all. Although the House and Senate roles are obviously related, 
they are still quite separate and distinct. The House must first 
determine whether a trial on the merits is warranted. If so, the 
Senate must determine whether the charges have been success-
fully proven. Certainly the chief justice's willingness to lend the 
Court's imprimatur to the House's articles (or his refusal to do 
so, perhaps in the form of a dissenting opinion) would give little 
if any indication of how he would manage or administer the Sen-
ate trial as its presiding officer. The chief justice has no vote in 
an impeachment trial, although he or she may be called upon to 
make procedural rulings. But those rulings can be overridden. 
Thus even a chief justice determined to influence substantially 
the outcome of a trial would be hard pressed to do so success-
fully. 
This potential conflict of interest also pales in the face of 
numerous other such conflicts of interest that Supreme Court 
justices routinely ignore. One might assume, for example, that 
any justice would be predisposed in favor of the president who 
appointed him or her, and thus should not participate in any case 
in which that president was a litigant. Yet just the opposite ap-
proach has been the norm: for example, Justices Burger, Black-
mun and Powell participated in United States v. Nixon,15 and Jus-
15. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Justice Rehnquist did in fact recuse 
himself in this case but not (or at least not formally) because he had been appointed by 
Richard Nixon. Rather, it was because he had been an assistant attorney general in the 
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tices Breyer and Ginsburg participated in Clinton v. Jones!6 In 
each of those instances the justices voted against the president 
who appointed them. These disputes were regarded as too im-
portant-too critical to the functioning of our constitutional sys-
tem- to warrant recusal for a theoretical conflict of interest with 
no basis in demonstrable bias. A similar logic would apply to 
our proposed judicial review of articles of impeachment against 
the president, especially since the Supreme Court would not 
have any authority to assess the weight of evidence against an 
accused president. 
Section 7 is merely standard constitutional language giving 
Congress the power to enforce the amendment. 
The impeachment clauses, like the Constitution itself, were 
written long ago. They contemplated a world, and a political 
system, that no longer exists. There were no political parties, 
and thus partisanship was not an issue; the Senate was not a 
popularly elected body and was generally expected to be a coun-
cil of "wise men" and experienced statesmen who would act as a 
brake on the "unbridled passions" of the House of Representa-
tives; judicial review was not mentioned in the constitution (the 
framers did reject a proposal to have the Supreme Court try im-
peachments); and the president was not expected to be the 
dominant national and international actor he has become. The 
original constitutional structure of impeachment thus made 
sense for its time. Providentially perhaps, it has worked rea-
sonably well. But it is now on the verge of a breakdown. The 
old adage "Don't fix it if it ain't broke," is good common sense. 
But a constitutional breakdown in the impeachment process 
would have serious implications for our political system. The 
prospect of a besieged president refusing to concede the legiti-
macy of his or her impeachment, or even unwilling to leave the 
White House after conviction, or of the nation's foreign affairs at 
a standstill for a protracted period of time for want of presiden-
tial leadership, counsels us to take action now, rather than later, 
to modify and relegitimize the impeachment process. Some-
times it is better to fix it before it breaks. 
Nixon administration. 
16. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997). 
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"AMENDMENT XXVIII" 
Section 1. The President, Vice President, members of the 
Cabinet, and federal judges, but not members of Congress or 
military officers, shall be removed from office on impeachment 
for, and conviction of, serious abuses of official power that un-
dermine their conduct of office and threaten the integrity and le-
gitimacy of the government. Such abuses include treason, bribery, 
and other serious crimes, as well as actions that are not criminal in 
nature. 
Section 2. The House of Representatives shall have the sole 
power of impeachment. The Senate shall have the exclusive right 
to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose senators 
shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President is tried the 
chief justice shall preside. No person shall be convicted without 
the concurrence of two-thirds of the membership of the Senate. 
Except when the president is tried, summary fact-finding proce-
dures established in advance may be employed. There is no right 
to a jury trial in cases of impeachment. No impeachment shall 
survive the biennial adjournment of Congress, nor shall an im-
peachment or trial take place between a general election and the 
convening of a new congress. 
Section 3. The consequences of conviction by the Senate on 
impeachment charges shall be limited to removal from office and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any appointed or elected office 
of honor, trust or profit under the United States. Removal from 
office is automatic upon conviction. Disqualification may be im-
posed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the Senate. The 
president shall not be subject to criminal indictment or prosecu-
tion, or civil suit, while in office, but all persons impeached and 
convicted shall be liable to subsequent indictment, trial, judgment, 
and punishment, or civil action, according to law. Congress may, 
by law, extend the statute of limitations in federal and state courts 
in both criminal and civil actions, for actions that a president may 
have committed. Congress also may grant to the president immu-
nity against subsequent prosecutions or civil actions in both fed-
eral and state courts. 
Section 4. Congress shall have the power to censure, rebuke, 
or otherwise publicly condemn official misconduct. Such action 
shall not constitute a bill of attainder nor shall it bar impeach-
ment. Congress may devise alternative means, other than im-
peachment, for dealing with the disability, misconduct, or failure 
to maintain good behaviour, of federal judges other than justices 
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of the Supreme Court. Removal from office of a judge by means 
other than impeachment shall require the assent of two-thirds of 
the members present of both the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives. 
Section 5. The President's power to grant reprieves and par-
dons for offenses against the United States shall not extend to 
cases of impeachment, nor shall a president have the power to is-
sue a self-pardon. 
Section 6. The Supreme Court, under its original jurisdiction, 
may review, prior to trial by the Senate, in a petition submitted by 
an impeached president, the procedures employed in, and the con-
stitutional basis of, articles of impeachment voted against the 
president by the House of Representatives. The Court shall not 
have the power to review impeachments against other officers nor 
any action by the Senate concerning articles of impeachment. 
Section 7. Congress shall have the power to enforce the pro-
visions of this article by appropriate legislation. 
